I have been a journalist for 40 years odd, mostly writing for foreign media clients in Africa, Europe, Cuba, the then Soviet Union, and China. Under apartheid, many countries had not been allowed to send their journalists to South Africa - and I filled that gap. Today, I focus my writings on the Middle East, more particularly on Israel's war on Gaza and Lebanon, the occupied West Bank in Isreal, and the current war on Iran. Just after Israel started its devastating war on Gaza in October 2023, I started a Facebook Group "The war on Gaza, a view from the South". Here I give analysis of what is happening in Gaza, Israel, Lebanon and the wider region. It became clear to me after October 2023, that South Africans do not understand the war on Gaza, what Israel is doing in the occupied West Bank, and where Lebanon fits into Israel's war games.
Toe ek vyf jaar lank in Iran sake probeer doen het en om kontrakte onderhandel het, het ek besef dat tyd nie vir die Irannese saak maak nie. Elke keer as ons dink die kontrak is nou reg om onderteken te word, pla iets anders die Irannese. Hulle is onvoorspelbaar en onverskrokke en partykeer net onverskillig-hardkoppig. Die pas mislukte onderhandelinge tussen Iran en Amerika wys hierdie aspekte duidelik uit.
Terwyl dit voortdurend afwisselende seine van optimisme en dooiepunte opgelewer het, het een waarheid ál duideliker geword: om ’n ooreenkoms met Teheran te bereik, is selde ’n vinnige of eenvoudige proses.
Oor dekades heen het Iran ’n reputasie opgebou as een van die wêreld se geduldigste en meesgesofistikeerde, onverskrokke onderhandelaars, iets wat Trump blykbaar nooit besef het nie. Terwyl Amerikaanse administrasies dikwels diplomasie met politieke tydlyne wat in maande of verkiesingsiklusse gemeet word benader, beskou Irannese leiers onderhandelinge tipies as strategiese wedstryde wat oor jare kan strek. (Obama se JCPOA-ooreenkoms het enkele jare geduur voor almal dit onderteken het.) Die gevolg is ’n volgehoue konflik tussen twee baie verskillende diplomatieke kulture.
Iran se benadering tot diplomasie is gewortel in ’n politieke tradisie wat eeue oud is. Talle diplomate, intelligensie-amptenare en streeksontleders beskryf Irannese onderhandelaars as metodies, gedissiplineerd en buitengewoon vaardig in die gebruik van tyd as ’n strategie.
Iran beskou sigself nie net as 'n Midde-Oosterse staat nie, maar as die erfgenaam van een van die wêreld se oudste beskawings. Die Persiese Ryk bestaan reeds meer as 2 500 jaar, veel ouer as Islam.
Hierdie geskiedenis skep 'n sterk gevoel van nasionale trots en die oortuiging dat Iran nie deur buitelandse moondhede voorgeskryf behoort te word nie. Daarom word druk of ultimatums dikwels as vernederend beskou, selfs wanneer kompromie moontlik is.
Geduld is deel van die strategie
In Westerse diplomasie word sukses dikwels gemeet aan hoe vinnig 'n ooreenkoms bereik word. Irannese onderhandelaars beskou tyd anders. Lang onderhandelinge word nie noodwendig as ʼn mislukking beskou nie, maar as 'n manier om:
• die teenstander se vasberadenheid te toets;
• meer inligting te bekom;
• wagtyd in eie guns te gebruik; en
• die bes moontlike toegewings te kry.
Baie kenners beskryf Iran se styl as een waarin geduld, uithouvermoë en volgehoue onderhandeling belangriker is as vinnige resultate.
In die Persiese kultuur speel konsepte soos eer, respek en waardigheid 'n groot rol. Dit beteken dat die manier waarop iets aangebied word, soms net so belangrik is as die inhoud daarvan. Irannese onderhandelaars sal dikwels eerder 'n moeiliker ooreenkoms aanvaar as dit hul waardigheid kan behou, as om 'n beter aanbod te aanvaar wat as vernederend ervaar word.
Sedert die Islamitiese Revolusie van 1979 word Iran se buitelandse beleid ook deur ideologie beïnvloed. Die regering beskou hulleself as 'n staat wat weerstand bied teen Westerse oorheersing, veral dié van Amerika. Daarom het onderhandelinge nie net 'n diplomatieke doel nie, maar ook 'n simboliese betekenis: Iran wil wys dat hulle nie onder dwang toegee nie – veral nie aan Amerika se druk nie.
Irannese leiers verwys gereeld na gebeurtenisse soos:
• die 1953-staatsgreep teen premier Mohammad Mosaddegh, waarby Amerikaanse en Britse intelligensiedienste betrokke was;
• dekades van ekonomiese sanksies; en
• die Amerikaanse onttrekking uit die 2015-kernooreenkoms (JCPOA) met Iran wat in 2018 deur President Barack Obama onderhandel is.
Hierdie geskiedenis versterk die oortuiging dat waarborge op papier nie noodwendig blywend is nie. Daarom probeer Iran dikwels eers konkrete voordele verkry voor hulle groot toegewings maak.
Dit sou egter verkeerd wees om Iran se onderhandelingstyl as bloot 'n kulturele verskynsel te beskryf. Iran tree ook op soos baie ander middelslag-moondhede: hulle probeer hulonderhandelingshefboom behou. Daarom sal hulle selde alles op een slag prys gee, of verbind hulle verskillende onderwerpe aan mekaar, of gebruik hulle tyd as ʼn manier om druk toe te pas, en probeer hulle hul sterkste kaarte hou tot die einde van die onderhandeling bereik is.
Wanneer Amerikaanse administrasies vinnige, beslissende ooreenkomste wil bereik, bots dit dikwels met Iran se voorkeur vir langdurige, stapsgewyse onderhandelinge waarin elke toegewing versigtig oorweeg word.
Vir Washington kan dit lyk of Iran tyd mors of nie opreg optree nie. Vanuit Teheran se perspektief is dit egter 'n manier om seker te maak dat Iran nie hul onderhandelingsposisie of nasionale waardigheid sonder voldoende teenprestasies prysgee nie. Hierdie verskil in onderhandelingskultuur en historiese ervaring is een van die redes waarom Amerikaans-Iranse onderhandelinge dikwels lank duur en herhaaldelik vasval.
As onderhandelinge lank genoeg kan aanhou, kan omstandighede verander: Politieke leierskap in Washington kan verskuif of vervang word, internasionale druk kan verswak, binnelandse druk kan verhoog, streeksdinamika kan verander, of sanksies kan minder doeltreffend raak. Vanuit Teheran se perspektief is geduld self ’n vorm van hefboomkrag.
Since the outbreak of war in Gaza following the Hamas-led attacks of 7 October 2023, the conflict has unfolded not only on the battlefield but also through a fierce global information war. The government of Israel and many of its Western allies have promoted a series of narratives designed to justify Israel’s military “campaign” in Gaza, while Palestinian voices, human rights organisations, genocide scholars and international legal bodies have increasingly challenged those claims.
The result has been one of the most polarised propaganda battles in modern history, with critics accusing major Western media outlets of amplifying Israeli government messaging while downplaying Palestinian suffering and the broader historical context of the conflict.
Israel’s propaganda or “Hasbara” budget for 2026 is reported to be between US$720-US$750 million. “Hasbara” is the Hebrew word that literally means “explaining”. It actually means “to explain actions, whether or not they are justified, in a way that portrays Israelis as perfect victims and Palestinians as perfect perpetrators.”
First to mind might be the memorable claim that 40 Israeli babies were beheaded by Hamas during their October 7th attack, a claim that was disproved and later dropped in the following weeks. In this warp of truth, the damage was done instantaneously, it almost didn’t matter whether it was true or not. The barbarity of false claims needed to match the barbarity of Israel’s intended assault on Gazans, in order to excuse it with no chance of reprisal. And it did just that. Despite Western governments walking back on its support of the claim due to lack of verifiable evidence, Israel’s invasion and indiscriminate attack on Gaza was well on its way.
Another example, Israel’s claim that UNRWA employees were involved in the October 7th attacks, triggering 10 Western governments to withdraw their funding to the agency, and curtailing the support of 6 million Palestinians overnight. The political and humanitarian effects of these claims were instantaneous, regardless of ‘truth’. These paint a simple picture of propaganda. However, what makes Hasbara uniquely programmed is its meticulous manipulation of every arena to which information is shared. And the fact that no international media are allowed to report live from inside Gaza for more than two years, further strengthens Israel’s hiding of the truth.
Below are eleven of the most contested claims surrounding the war on Gaza and the counterarguments increasingly raised by international observers.
1. “The conflict began on 7 October 2023”
Israeli officials frequently frame the war on Gaza as beginning with the Hamas attack on southern Israel on 7 October 2023. Former US President Joe Biden compared the assault to “15 times 9/11.”
Critics argue this framing erases decades of Israeli occupation, forced displacement, blockade, apartheid rule, and violence predating 7 October. Palestinian and several Israeli historians, as well as international scholars point to the Nakba and the forced displacement of more than 700,000 Palestinians in 1948, the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza since 1967, and repeated wars in Gaza as essential context for understanding the conflict.
They argue that isolating 7 October from its historical background presents the war as an unprovoked eruption rather than part of a much longer struggle over land, statehood and resistance against occupation.
2. “The Israeli military only targets Hamas”
The Israeli government insists its military operations are aimed at Hamas fighters and infrastructure, not civilians.
However, UN agencies, human rights organisations and independent analysts have documented widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure including apartment blocks, schools, universities, hospitals, refugee camps, the agriculture sector and water systems.
Critics argue that the scale of civilian casualties – more than 72,000 deaths - and the intense devastation inside Gaza raise serious questions about proportionality and distinction under international humanitarian law.
3. “Palestine is Hamas”
A recurring narrative in Israeli and some Western political discourse equates the whole Palestinian society with Hamas.
Palestinian intellectuals and human rights advocates reject this outright, arguing that Palestinians are not reducible to a single political or armed resistance movement. They stress that Palestinian society includes academics, doctors, artists, journalists, labourers, students and civil society organisations with a wide range of political views.
Critics say blending all Palestinians with Hamas risks collectively criminalising an entire civilian population.
4. “Hamas is ISIS”
Israeli officials and commentators have repeatedly compared Hamas to the so-called Islamic State group. America and several Western governments have classified Hamas as a “terrorist” movement, mainly because they include civilian targets in its attacks.
Opponents of this comparison argue that while Hamas has carried out deadly attacks and is designated a terrorist organisation by many Western states, it emerged from a specific Palestinian nationalist and Islamist context tied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rather than from the transnational jihadist ideology associated with ISIS. They argue that reducing Hamas to ISIS-style extremism oversimplifies the political and historical dimensions of the conflict.
Hamas has since its foundation in 1987 never attacked any other country outside of what is today known as Israel, Gaza and the occupied West Bank.
5. “Hamas hides among civilians”
Israel frequently argues that Hamas uses civilians as human shields by operating in densely populated urban areas.
International legal experts note that even if armed groups operate among civilians, this does not remove Israel’s obligations under the laws of war to distinguish between military and civilian targets and to avoid disproportionate attacks. The wanton destruction of Gaza during the past two-and-a-half years clearly illustrates this point. Critics further argue that Gaza’s extreme population density leaves few realistic alternatives for armed groups operating within the enclave.
The Gaza strip’s population density is about 5,500 people per square kilometre. In Gaza City , it is much denser, at roughly 13,000 people per square kilometre.
6. “There is no genocide in Gaza”
Israel and its supporters, including the US, strongly reject accusations of genocide, arguing that civilian casualties are a “tragic but unavoidable” result of urban warfare.
However, genocide scholars, rights groups and legal experts increasingly point to statements by Israeli officials, mass displacement, forced starvation, conditions of severe malnutrition, and the destruction of civilian life as evidence that warrants serious legal scrutiny under the Genocide Convention.
The case brought by South Africa before the International Court of Justice has intensified global debate over whether Israel’s conduct may meet the threshold for genocidal acts or intent.
Western or European countries where “genocide” language has been used include Spain, Italy, Ireland, Belgium, Slovenia, and Norway.
Governments explicitly stating that genocide is taking place include South Africa, Türkiye, and several Arab and Global South governments such as Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Maldives, North Korea, Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Guyana, Belize, Chile, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Mauritania, Senegal, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, and Namibia.
Critics also reject the argument that accusations of genocide are inherently antisemitic, stressing that criticism of Israeli state policy is distinct from hostility toward Jewish people.
7. “Gaza is no longer occupied”
Israel argues that its 2005 withdrawal of Israeli settlers and troops ended the occupation of Gaza.
The United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and many legal scholars disagree, noting that Israel continues to control Gaza’s airspace, maritime access, borders and crossings, population registry and all movement of goods and people.
Under international law, many experts therefore still classify Gaza as occupied territory.
8. “Israel is allowing humanitarian aid into Gaza”
Israeli officials say aid deliveries are permitted and that Hamas is responsible for shortages, either by diverting it or outright stealing aid.
Yet the United Nations, humanitarian agencies and international aid groups have repeatedly warned that Israeli restrictions, inspections, border closures and military operations have severely obstructed aid delivery. Israeli aligned armed militia groups are also playing a role in ensuring that aid delivery is hampered. In addition, Israel allows unscrupulous and known criminals to force the payment of heavy levies on all goods allowed into Gaza. These levies have been running in hundreds of millions of US$.
Multiple international agencies and UN bodies say Gaza needs about 500–600 aid trucks every day to meet basic humanitarian needs. Actual daily entry figures reported at various times have been well below that requirement; they ranged from only a few dozen trucks on some days to several hundred on other days depending on the security and diplomatic situation. Examples include reports of 36 trucks or 62 trucks on particular days, and limited periods when 600–800 trucks were reported during ceasefire windows.
Reports of forced famine, collapsing healthcare systems and widespread diseases have intensified accusations that humanitarian assistance is being used by Israel as a pressure mechanism during the war.
9. “Palestinian casualty figures are unreliable”
Israeli officials and some commentators frequently question casualty figures issued by “Gaza’s Health Ministry”. The latter put the current death toll since 7 October 2023 at 72,770, and more than 172,468 people wounded.
The UN, the World Health Organization, OCHA, UNICEF, UNDP, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and most international media organisations continue to rely on those figures, noting that past conflicts showed Gaza casualty data broadly aligned with later independent investigations.
The Gaza Health Ministry verifies identities by recording a person’s full name, identity number, date of birth, and date of death, often from hospital or morgue registration when a body is brought in. If any of those key fields are missing, the record is treated as incomplete.
Critics argue that repeated attempts to discredit Palestinian casualty figures risk minimising civilian suffering.
10. “Evacuation warnings prove Israel protects civilians”
Israel says evacuation notices demonstrate its efforts to minimise civilian harm, a method also now being used in Lebanon – but with no clear saving of lives.
Human rights organisations counter that forcing civilians to flee repeatedly without guaranteeing safety, shelter, food or the right of return can amount to forcible transfer under international law. In addition, many Palestinians have been displaced multiple times, often into areas later struck by Israeli attacks.
It is, however, also true that most attacks came without any warning.
11. “If Hamas surrendered, the war would end”
The claim that “if Hamas surrendered, the war would end” oversimplifies the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by portraying Hamas as the sole cause of the violence. In reality, the conflict long predates Hamas, which was founded in 1987, and is rooted in decades of occupation, displacement, settlement expansion, and unresolved Palestinian demands for statehood and self-determination. Israeli military operations and territorial disputes have also continued in areas where Hamas is not in power, including the occupied West Bank.
Critics further argue that statements by members of the Israeli government indicate broader political and territorial objectives beyond simply defeating Hamas, including maintaining long-term control over Palestinian territories and rejecting Palestinian sovereignty. Human rights organizations have also accused Israel of policies amounting to collective punishment and serious violations of international law.
Even if Hamas were to surrender, Gaza would still face devastation, displacement, blockade-related restrictions, and unresolved political grievances. History has shown that armed resistance movements often re-emerge when underlying political conditions remain unchanged. The argument therefore ignores the deeper structural causes of the conflict and creates the misleading impression that removing one group would automatically bring lasting peace.
Conclusion
Still, as civilian suffering deepens and international legal scrutiny grows, the battle over which narrative will define the conflict remains central to how the world understands Gaza — and how history may ultimately judge the war.
The city of Bethlehem - revered worldwide as the birthplace of Jesus Christ - has increasingly become a focal point in debates over the future of Christianity in the so-called Holy Land. As demographic decline, land disputes, and rising insecurity converge, analysts and church leaders are asking a difficult question: can a region still be called “holy” if its historic Christian communities are steadily disappearing?
Out of Israel’s 10 million population, only 1,9% are Christians.
Bethlehem is located in the West Bank, a territory that is widely regarded by the international community - including the United Nations - as being under Israeli occupation since 1967.
Administratively, Bethlehem falls under the Palestinian Authority (Area A), meaning it has Palestinian civil and security control in the city itself. However, Israel maintains overall control over borders, airspace, and movement in and out of the West Bank, and Israeli settlements and military presence in surrounding areas play a significant role in daily life.
A demographic transformation
Bethlehem’s transformation is stark. Once an overwhelmingly Christian town - estimated at 86% in 1950 - its Christian population today stands at roughly 10–15%. This dramatic shift reflects a broader regional trend, but in Bethlehem the drivers are particularly visible and geographically concentrated.
The expansion of illegal Israeli settlements, including Har Homa and Gilo, has reshaped the city’s physical and economic landscape. Built in part on land described as confiscated from local owners, these illegal settlements, alongside the separation barrier, now encircle more than 70% of Bethlehem’s municipal area. The effect is not only spatial confinement but also economic isolation.
Land, access, and economic decline
For Bethlehem’s Christian residents, land has historically been both a livelihood and a link to identity. Agricultural areas and tourism-related businesses - long dominated by Christian families - have been steadily eroded by land seizures and movement restrictions.
Access to Jerusalem, located just 10 kilometres away, has become increasingly difficult. This has severely disrupted pilgrimage-based tourism, once the backbone of Bethlehem’s economy. An opinion poll found that 78% of residents identified the separation barrier and settlement expansion as the primary drivers of emigration.
More recent developments, such as plans for settlement outposts near Beit Jala - including Jabal al-Makhrur - have intensified fears that remaining farmland and economic opportunities will vanish. Advocacy groups like Kairos Palestine have described the situation as an “existential threat,” warning that Bethlehem risks becoming a “ghost town” dependent on dwindling numbers of pilgrims.
Rising harassment and insecurity
Alongside economic pressures, rising incidents of harassment against Christians in Israel have added a new layer of urgency. According to the Religious Freedom Data Centre, 181 incidents targeting Christians were recorded in Israel and East Jerusalem in 2025, including spitting, verbal abuse, vandalism, and physical assaults. An additional 44 cases were documented in the first three months of 2026 alone.
Data from the Rossing Centre corroborates the trend, recording 155 attacks in 2025. Many incidents were concentrated in Jerusalem’s Old City, particularly in the Armenian Quarter, and were attributed largely to ultra-Orthodox individuals and nationalist groups.
While some perpetrators have been arrested in high-profile cases, conviction rates remain low, reinforcing a perception among many Christians that accountability is limited. Surveys suggest that nearly half of young Christians under 30 in Israel are considering emigration, citing insecurity and a lack of social acceptance.
The psychology of departure
The cumulative effect of these pressures - economic stagnation, land loss, and social hostility - has created what local leaders describe as a climate of fear and uncertainty. In Christian communities near Bethlehem such as Taybeh, even small-scale incidents have contributed to family departures, with at least 16 families leaving since 2023.
For many, emigration is not a sudden decision but the result of prolonged erosion of hope. The psychological toll of repeated incidents - whether direct violence or symbolic acts like the vandalism of religious sites - has weakened community resilience. Historic churches and monasteries increasingly stand as markers of continuity, even as the populations that sustained them shrink.
Competing narratives
Interpretations of these developments vary sharply. Palestinian Christian leaders and advocacy groups often frame the situation as systemic, linking Israeli settlement expansion, movement restrictions, and harassment into a broader pattern of displacement. Israeli officials, by contrast, tend to emphasize economic factors, voluntary migration, and broader demographic trends, including higher birth rates among other communities.
This divergence reflects deeper political disagreements over the nature of the conflict and responsibility for its human consequences.
A question of identity
The implications extend beyond Bethlehem. Across Israel, Christian populations have declined sharply, including in Jerusalem, where they now account for just 1.5–2% of residents. As communities shrink, concerns are growing that the Holy Land could evolve into a place where Christian heritage is preserved primarily for tourism, rather than lived experience.
The phrase “Christian Disneyland,” increasingly invoked by religious leaders, captures this anxiety: a landscape of sacred sites without the communities that give them meaning.
An uncertain future
Bethlehem’s trajectory encapsulates a broader regional dilemma. The city remains a global symbol of faith, drawing millions of pilgrims over time, yet its local Christian population continues to dwindle.
Whether the term “Holy Land” retains its meaning may ultimately depend not only on the preservation of sacred sites, but on the survival of the communities that have inhabited them for centuries. For now, the trends suggest a widening gap between the symbolic significance of the region and the lived reality of those who call it home.
From South Asia to the Middle East, the geopolitical fault lines of the 21st century continue to trace back to decisions made under British imperial rule. In regions as contested as Kashmir and the Gaza Strip, the legacy of hurried partitions, ambiguous mandates, and conflicting political promises remains deeply embedded in today’s conflicts.
The drawing of the Radcliffe Line in 1947 and the policies underpinning the Balfour Declaration are often cited as pivotal moments when imperial strategy took precedence over local realities. While decades of war, nationalism, and regional politics have since reshaped these disputes, analysts argue that Britain’s role as a principal architect of these borders continues to cast a long shadow - one that still influences cycles of violence, contested sovereignty, and unresolved statehood today.
India–Pakistan and Kashmir
The most prominent example of this legacy is the 1947 partition of British India, which led to the creation of India and Pakistan under British supervision. The boundary, hastily drawn by Cyril Radcliffe, divided the subcontinent along religious lines despite his lack of prior familiarity with the region. The resulting demarcation split provinces such as Punjab and Bengal, triggering one of the largest forced migrations in modern history and unleashing widespread communal violence.
At the heart of this upheaval lies Kashmir. The princely state’s ambiguous status at partition left it contested between India and Pakistan, sparking multiple wars and entrenching a dispute that persists into the nuclear age. Today, Kashmir remains one of the most volatile flashpoints in global geopolitics, with periodic escalations underscoring the enduring instability rooted in the original partition framework.
Britain and the Partition of Palestine
The most crucial mistake or miscalculation of all came to the Middle East at the same time. Britain’s role in the 1947 partition of Palestine was both foundational and paradoxical: it shaped the conditions that made partition likely yet stepped back at the moment of decision and implementation. As the governing authority of Mandatory Palestine, Britain inherited overlapping wartime promises and attempted to manage two increasingly incompatible national movements.
At the core of the tension was the Balfour Declaration, which expressed support for the establishment of a national home for foreign Jews, while also committing to protect the rights of the existing Arab population who were already in the area. In practice, British policy struggled to reconcile these commitments. Jewish immigration increased during the interwar period, while Palestinian Arab opposition intensified, leading to cycles of unrest, including the Arab Revolt of the late 1930s. Britain responded with shifting policies - at times restricting immigration, at other times accommodating it - but failed to produce a political settlement acceptable to both sides.
By the mid-1940s, the situation had become increasingly unmanageable. Jewish paramilitary groups carried out attacks against British forces and infrastructure, while intercommunal violence escalated. Facing mounting costs, declining imperial capacity after World War II, and growing international pressure, Britain chose to refer the issue to the United Nations in 1947 rather than impose a unilateral solution.
The United Nations subsequently proposed (an illegal) partition under General Assembly Resolution 181, recommending separate Jewish and Arab states. Britain, however, adopted a position of detachment. It abstained from the vote and, critically, declined to enforce or oversee the implementation of the plan. Instead, it announced a timetable to terminate its mandate and withdraw its forces.
This decision created a political and security vacuum. As British authority receded, violence between Jewish and Arab communities intensified, transitioning into open conflict. When Britain formally withdrew in May 1948, no agreed mechanism existed to manage the transition. The declaration of the State of Israel was followed immediately by regional war, and large-scale Palestinian displacement reshaped the demographic and political landscape.
Analytically, Britain’s role can be understood in three phases: it acted first as the architect of competing national frameworks, then as the arbiter unable to reconcile them, and finally as the exiting power that declined to enforce the proposed solution. The result was not simply partition, but a contested and violent transition whose consequences continue to define the Israeli-Palestinian conflict even today.
And, then there was Iraq.
Britain and the Iraq War: From justification to aftermath
Britain’s role in the 2003 Iraq War reflects a more contemporary example of its influence on conflict trajectories - this time not through imperial boundary-making, but through strategic alliance and intervention. Under Prime Minister Tony Blair, the United Kingdom emerged as the most significant international partner to the United States in the invasion of Iraq, which ultimately led to the capture and execution of Saddam Hussein.
In the lead-up to the war, Britain played a central role in shaping the political and public case for intervention. The Blair government argued that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and posed an imminent threat, presenting intelligence dossiers that were later widely challenged. This positioning helped lend international legitimacy to the invasion, even as debate persisted within the United Nations over the legal basis for military action.
British forces were directly involved in the invasion and subsequent occupation, particularly in southern Iraq. However, the post-war phase exposed significant shortcomings. No stockpiles of WMDs were found, undermining the central justification for the war and fuelling widespread criticism both domestically and internationally.
The long-term consequences were formally examined in the Chilcot Inquiry, published in 2016. The report concluded that the UK government had overstated the intelligence on Iraq’s weapons capabilities, failed to exhaust peaceful alternatives, and was inadequately prepared for the aftermath of regime change. These findings reinforced the perception that Britain had committed to the war on flawed premises and without a coherent post-conflict strategy.
Analytically, Britain’s involvement in Iraq highlights a different dimension of its global role. Rather than acting as a colonial architect, it functioned as a strategic enabler - supporting and legitimising a major military intervention whose consequences reshaped Iraq and the wider region. The removal of Saddam Hussein did not produce stability, but instead contributed to prolonged instability, sectarian conflict, and regional power shifts that continue to reverberate.
This episode underscores a recurring theme in Britain’s international engagements: decisions taken in alignment with broader strategic objectives can carry far-reaching and unintended consequences, particularly when the assumptions underpinning those decisions prove to be flawed.
By Jurie van der Walt- 21 April 2026
Strong viewpoints that Israel is operating “above the law” in its wars on Gaza and on Lebanon have intensified global scrutiny, but a definitive legal judgment remains elusive. A wide range of accusations - spanning war crimes, crimes against humanity, and also genocide - have been raised by UN bodies, human rights organisations, and several governments. Yet despite the severity of these claims, international legal institutions such as the International Criminal Court have not delivered a final verdict.
This apparent delay has fuelled frustration among critics, who see it as evidence of selective justice or political bias. However, the reality is more complex. International law operates within a framework that demands exceptionally high evidentiary standards, especially for the most serious crimes. Investigations must navigate active conflict zones, contested narratives, and limited access to reliable data, all while adhering to strict due process requirements.
Statements by Israeli officials
A UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry concluded Israel committed genocide in Gaza, citing statements by Israeli officials as direct evidence of genocidal intent. These, combined with actions like mass killings and starvation, showed intent to destroy Palestinians "in whole or in part." Specific examples include calls to "erase Gaza" and patterns exceeding military needs.
In November 2023, Netanyahu invoked Biblical Amalek (total extermination of a people, including infants): "Remember what Amalek has done to you... We do remember," framing Gaza operations.
In August 2024, Israeli ultra-right wing Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich called for Gaza's "total annihilation," starving residents as "justified and moral," and "Gaza will be entirely destroyed" (May 2025).
Amnesty identified 22 senior officials' statements (e.g., "erase Gaza," make uninhabitable), replicated by soldiers, as proving intent amid the apartheid and blockade context.
In the meantime, geopolitical divisions continue to shape the pace and scope of accountability. Institutions like the United Nations remain constrained by competing state interests, while jurisdictional disputes - particularly Israel’s rejection of ICC authority - further complicate proceedings.
The result is a legal process that moves slowly, often lagging far behind the immediacy of events on the ground. This gap between allegation and adjudication lies at the heart of a growing debate: whether the international legal system is failing to act decisively, or whether it is functioning exactly as designed in the face of one of the most complex and politically charged conflicts of the modern era.
Below is a structured classification of the listed allegations according to the three main legal categories under international law. This is an analytical grouping of claims, not a legal verdict. Many of these issues are under investigation by bodies such as the International Criminal Court and the United Nations.
War crimes (most widely alleged)
Serious violations of the Geneva Conventions during armed conflict
Attacks and conduct of warfare
Weapons-related allegations
Humanitarian access and survival
Displacement and civilian impact
Detention-related
Other conduct
Crimes against humanity (under investigation)
(Widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population)
Core allegations raised by legal experts
Related claims from the list
Genocide (legally and politically contested)
(Acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group under the Genocide Convention)
Allegations cited
Key point:
Genocide requires proof of specific intent, which is extremely difficult to establish legally. These claims are highly contested and not adjudicated.
Other international law violations (outside the three core categories)
Occupation and territorial issues
State responsibility and sovereignty
Human rights law (non-war-specific)
West Bank–specific issues
Cross-cutting legal principles cited
These are not crimes themselves, but standards used to assess legality:
These principles are frequently invoked by groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch when evaluating conduct.
By Jurie van der Walt – 16 April 2026
When German Chancellor Friedrich Merz expressed deep concern about Israel’s de facto annexation of the West Bank, Israel’s far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich replied that Merz should apologize “rather than daring to preach morality to us on how to conduct ourselves against the Nazis of our generation,” in a clear reference to Hamas and the Palestinians in the occupied areas. In November 2023, the same Israeli Minister referred to “the 2 million Nazis” in Gaza and the West Bank.
It must be remembered that in a landmark opinion in July 2024, the International Court of Justice declared Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory illegal and called for the evacuation of all settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Since 7 October 2023, the occupied West Bank has entered one of the most severe phases of Palestinian displacement since Israel’s occupation began in 1967. What is unfolding is no longer a pattern of isolated settler attacks or sporadic military raids, but an increasingly coordinated system of territorial fragmentation, demographic engineering, and ideological violence driven by extremist settler movements and reinforced by a far-right Israeli political order.
A strategy of removal, not random violence
Human rights investigators, Israeli watchdog groups, and international observers increasingly describe settler violence as part of a deliberate strategy aimed at territorial acquisition. The attacks - burning homes, uprooting olive groves, poisoning water access, seizing grazing land, and intimidating farmers - are designed to make Palestinian life unsustainable.
The pattern is strikingly consistent:
This strategy has become particularly evident in Bedouin and herding communities across the Jordan Valley, South Hebron Hills, and central West Bank, where entire villages have vanished under sustained pressure.
The United Nations has described this pattern as ethnic cleansing, citing the deliberate removal of Palestinians from strategic land corridors.
The ideological engine: Religious Nationalism and territorial absolutism
At the core of this escalation lies a fusion of religious nationalism and expansionist territorial ideology.
Among extremist settler factions, the occupied West Bank - referred to as Judea and Samaria - is regarded not as occupied territory subject to negotiation, but as sacred inheritance permanently belonging to the Jewish people. Some radical groups interpret biblical narratives as granting divine legitimacy to expelling Palestinians and preventing the emergence of a Palestinian state.
This ideology is not representative of Judaism as a religion.
Mainstream Jewish teaching does not sanction violence against civilians, forced displacement, or harassment of non-Jews. Numerous rabbis, Israeli scholars, and Jewish human rights advocates have denounced these acts as violations of Jewish ethics.
Israeli groups such as B’Tselem, Yesh Din, and Breaking the Silence have repeatedly documented settler attacks and criticized Israeli state complicity.
The violence stems not from Judaism broadly, but from ultra-nationalist supremacist currents that weaponize selective religious interpretations for political ends.
The political climate: State power and settler impunity
The intensification of settler violence cannot be separated from Israel’s political transformation under increasingly hardline governments.
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir - both key figures in Israel’s ultra-far-right governing coalition - have openly championed settlement expansion and opposed Palestinian sovereignty.
Critics argue that their rhetoric has normalized extremist ambitions previously confined to the fringes.
Under this political climate:
Multiple investigations show that perpetrators are rarely prosecuted, despite video evidence and eyewitness documentation. In many cases, Israeli soldiers are present during attacks but fail to intervene - or actively shield settlers.
This lack of accountability creates what human rights groups describe as a regime of structured impunity.
The IDF’s role: Passive observer or active enabler?
Although the Israeli government formally distinguishes between state military operations and unauthorized settler violence, realities on the ground often blur that line.
Palestinian testimonies and rights reports repeatedly document patterns in which:
Where the IDF does not directly assist settler expansion, it frequently creates the security umbrella under which it proceeds.
This institutional overlap has led many analysts to argue that settler violence functions as an unofficial arm of state territorial policy.
“Price tag” violence and revenge campaigns
A recurring feature of settler militancy is the so-called “price tag” doctrine: retaliatory attacks launched after the death of a settler, Palestinian militant operations, or even Israeli government actions perceived as restraining settlement growth.
These attacks often include:
Such incidents are not spontaneous mob reactions, but frequently organized punitive operations designed to terrorize communities into flight.
Christians increasingly targeted: Nationalism expands beyond Palestinians
While Palestinian Muslims remain the principal targets of religious nationalist aggression, Christian communities in Jerusalem are increasingly facing harassment as well.
The Israeli-based Religious Freedom Data Centre (RFDC) has recorded a 65% rise in anti-Christian incidents in Jerusalem, including:
RFDC director Yisca Harani attributes the increase to “the national mood,” citing a growing atmosphere of Jewish superiority cultivated in public discourse.
This reflects a dangerous ideological spillover: once hostility toward one non-Jewish population is normalized, other minorities become vulnerable as well.
Dehumanization as political method
A common thread connecting anti-Palestinian and anti-Christian violence is the dehumanization of non-Jews.
In extremist settler discourse, Palestinians are often portrayed not as a civilian population with legal rights, but as obstacles to redemption, demographic threats, or illegitimate occupants. Christians, especially Palestinian Christians, increasingly fall into similar categories of exclusion.
This worldview transforms violence from aberration into perceived duty.
Economic destruction as forced migration
Settler attacks are also calibrated to destroy Palestinian economic survival.
By targeting olive harvests, water wells, livestock grazing routes, and irrigation systems, settlers undermine the material basis of rural Palestinian existence. For many communities, displacement comes not after direct expulsion, but after livelihoods collapse.
This slow violence is often more effective than overt military removal because it leaves families with no viable option but departure.
Annexation by attrition
What is emerging in the occupied West Bank is a model of annexation without formal declaration.
Rather than immediate legal annexation, the process unfolds incrementally:
The cumulative result is territorial consolidation under Israeli control without explicit legal proclamation.
Conclusion: A crisis beyond security
The current crisis in the occupied West Bank cannot be explained solely as a security response to militant threats. It reflects a deeper ideological project: the remaking of the land through displacement, demographic engineering, and nationalist-religious supremacy.
This is not Judaism in its mainstream religious form, nor the view of all Israelis. It is the product of a radical political alliance between extremist settler movements and state actors willing to tolerate or enable them.
The ongoing confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran has entered a phase defined less by decisive military outcomes than by strategic ambiguity, conflicting narratives, and a widening circle of uncertainty. What began in late February 2026 as a seemingly coordinated campaign under “Operation Epic Fury” has evolved into a war marked by unclear objectives, inconsistent messaging, and the growing risk of escalation beyond initial expectations.
Confusion
At the heart of the confusion lies a breakdown in coherent narrative control. Donald Trump framed the initial strikes as pre-emptive, aimed at neutralizing “imminent threats.” Yet other officials suggested a more reactive posture, implying that Israeli actions had drawn Washington deeper into the conflict than originally intended. This divergence has not only complicated public understanding but also raised questions within allied capitals about the true strategic endgame.
Iran’s response has further destabilized the situation. Retaliatory strikes on U.S. bases across the Middle East have expanded the geographical scope of the conflict, undermining early assumptions that escalation could be contained. At the same time, Tehran itself appears to be grappling with internal communication breakdowns, as sustained U.S.-Israeli attacks disrupt command structures. The result is a paradox: a state capable of coordinated regional retaliation, yet seemingly fragmented in its diplomatic signalling, particularly regarding the prospect of negotiations.
Divided support
Within the United States, this ambiguity is mirrored in public sentiment. The war has produced a striking duality in perception. Tactical successes - such as strikes on Iranian military infrastructure and assets linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - have generated moments of support, particularly among Republican constituencies. Yet these are tempered by unease over Iranian retaliation, the absence of clear objectives, and the spectre of another protracted Middle Eastern conflict. Polling data reflects this division: strong partisan approval on one side, overwhelming scepticism on the other, and a large bloc of independents expressing cautious ambivalence.
This divided sentiment is not merely political; it reflects a deeper strategic uncertainty. Americans appear to be simultaneously drawn to demonstrations of strength and wary of the long-term consequences. The memory of past conflicts - costly, extended, and often inconclusive - looms large, shaping a public mood that is neither fully supportive nor entirely opposed, but deeply conflicted.
Good cop, bad cop
Complicating matters further is the perception of a “good cop, bad cop” dynamic between Washington and Tel Aviv. The United States projects a dual posture: signalling openness to negotiation and de-escalation, while intermittently participating in or enabling military strikes. Israel, by contrast, has pursued a more overtly aggressive strategy, targeting nuclear infrastructure and high-value Iranian assets. This division of roles allows Washington to maintain diplomatic flexibility while benefiting from the pressure generated by Israeli actions.
However, this dynamic is far from seamless. Iranian leaders, including Ali Khamenei, have long characterized the relationship as a coordinated strategy designed to coerce Tehran - Israel as the military enforcer, the U.S. as the negotiating counterpart. Yet recent developments suggest genuine friction. Israeli leadership, particularly under Benjamin Netanyahu, has signalled a preference for sustained military pressure and even regime change, while Washington appears intermittently inclined toward negotiation. Reports of potential US–Iran talks have reportedly unsettled Israeli officials, who fear being sidelined in decisions that directly affect their security calculus.
Which countries supply Iran with new munitions?
Adding another layer to the conflict is the question of Iran’s military resilience. Despite sustained bombardment, Iran has continued to launch missile and drone attacks, suggesting a robust and adaptive supply chain. Analysts increasingly point to external support, particularly from Russia and China. These relationships form what some observers describe as an “axis of evasion” - a network of procurement and production that allows Iran to replenish critical components despite sanctions and military pressure.
China’s role is often linked to the provision of dual-use technologies - navigation systems, sensors, and chemical precursors - frequently routed through intermediaries to obscure their origin. Russia, meanwhile, contributes through technical cooperation, including drone production and battlefield adaptation, reversing earlier patterns seen in other conflicts. While neither country is directly intervening militarily, their indirect support complicates efforts by the U.S. and Israel to degrade Iran’s capabilities decisively.
Taken together, these dynamics point to a conflict that is no longer linear or easily defined. It is simultaneously a conventional military confrontation, a proxy struggle, a diplomatic chess match, and an economic contest shaped by sanctions and supply chains. Each layer introduces new variables, making coherent strategy increasingly difficult to sustain.
The result is a war characterized by drift rather than direction. Objectives remain vague, alliances show signs of strain, and the lines between escalation and containment continue to blur. In such an environment, the greatest risk may not be outright defeat for any one actor, but the gradual entrenchment of a conflict that resists resolution - prolonging instability across the region and beyond.
Die kwessie van Suid-Afrikaners wat in die Israeliese Weermag (IW) dien, het van ’n randverskynsel in aktivistiese kringe verskuif na ’n sentrale regs- en politieke debat, veral ná Israel se oorlog teen Gasa en Suid-Afrika se eie regsaak teen Israel by die Internasionale Geregshof. Hoewel die verskynsel nie nuut is nie, het onlangse data en verhoogde diplomatieke spanning die fokus op wie vir Israel diensplig doen verskerp, onder watter regsmandaat en of Suid-Afrika bereid of in staat is om op te tree.
Getalle en omvang
Volgens ’n Februarie 2026-ondersoek deur Declassified UK, gebaseer op IW-data van Maart 2025, doen minstens 589 Suid-Afrikaners met dubbele burgerskap en 16 persone met veelvuldige burgerskap diesnsplig in die IW gedurende die Gasa-oorlogtydperk. Hierdie syfers plaas Suid-Afrika onder die middelvlak-bydraers tot die Israeliese weermag – minder as lande soos die Verenigde State (12,135), Frankryk (6,127), Rusland (5,067) en Oekraine (3,901), maar voor baie ander kleiner lande.
Daar word algemeen aanvaar dat die meeste van hierdie Suid-Afrikaners as reserviste of dienspligtiges gedien het, eerder as sogenaamde “lone soldiers” (buitelandse burgers sonder Israeliese burgerskap). Vroeëre syfers van die Lone Soldier Centre het slegs 59 Suid-Afrikaners in Israeliese gevegseenhede vóór 2024 aangedui - ’n getal wat dubbele-burgers uitgesluit het en die werklike omvang dus beduidend onderskat het.
Regeringswaarskuwings en die regsraamwerk
Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering het herhaaldelik gewaarsku dat diensplig in ’n buitelandse gewapende mag sonder toestemming onwettig is. Ingevolge die Wet op die Regulering van Buitelandse Militêre Bystand moet Suid-Afrikaanse burgers goedkeuring van die regering verkry voordat hulle militêre diens in die buiteland verrig. Die Nasionale Konvensionele Wapenbeheerkomitee het bevestig dat geen toestemmings toegestaan is vir Suid-Afrikaners om aan Israeliese militêre operasies in Gasa of enige ander plek deel te neem nie.
Daarbenewens bepaal die Suid-Afrikaanse Burgerskapswet dat genaturaliseerde burgers hul burgerskap kan verloor indien hulle aan oorloë deelneem wat nie Suid-Afrika ondersteun word nie. Hierdie bepaling is herhaaldelik deur regeringsamptenare aangehaal om die moontlike gevolge vir Suid-Afrikaners wat in die IW dien, te beklemtoon.
Bewerings, klagtes en bekende gevalle
Benewens saamgestelde syfers het individuele gevalle van tyd tot tyd na vore gekom. Media-ondersoeke en hofstukke beweer dat Suid-Afrikaanse burgers in die IW as valskermsoldate, gevegsingenieurs en “lone soldiers” gedien het vanaf minstens 2014 en 2018 tot en met die onlangse (2023-2025) Gasa-konflik. Sommige individue het hul IW-diens tydens militêre operasies soos Protective Edge (2014) op sosiale media gedeel, wat gedeeltelike self-dokumentasie verskaf.
Regsaktiviste het gepoog om hierdie bewerings te konsolideer. Die sogenaamde “Gasa-dossier”, saamgestel deur prokureur Ziyaad Patel, poog om werwingsnetwerke en individuele deelname te dokumenteer, insluitend bewerings dat werwingsaktiwiteite in Suid-Afrika plaasgevind het. Hierdie pogings het egter herhaaldelik te doen gekry met probleme om die klagtes te bewys, onder meer weens beperkte toegang tot amptelike IW-bevestiging en die minimum vereistes vir strafregtelike vervolging.
Dit is belangrik om daarop te let dat baie van die genoemde individue nie publiek op die bewerings gereageer het nie en dat die aansprake dikwels op ondersoekende joernalistiek eerder as op regsbevindings berus het.
Historiese presedente en gebrek aan handhawing
Suid-Afrikaners wat in die IW dien, is nie ’n nuwe verskynsel nie. Klagtes wat terugdateer na die 2008–2009 Gasa-oorlog en daaropvolgende Israeliese militêre veldtogte het reeds beweerde deelname deur Suid-Afrikaanse burgers gedokumenteer, insluitend ’n hoëprofiel-saak wat Lt.kol. David Benjamin betrek het. Sedert 2009 is meer as 70 sake na bewering aan die Nasionale Vervolgingsgesag verwys.
Ten spyte hiervan het geen skuldigbevindings gevolg nie. Vorige ondersoeke na werwing, onder meer by Johannesburgse polisiekantore en private Krav Maga-opleidingsfasiliteite, het nie tot vervolgings gelei nie. Hierdie patroon van waarskuwings sonder opvolg het ’n kenmerkende aspek van die debat in Suid-Afrika geword.
Waarom handhawing so moeilik is
Regskenners wys op verskeie struikelblokke. Dubbele burgerskap bemoeilik handhawing, veral waar individue ná emigrasie (“aliyah”) ingevolge Israeliese wet dienspligtig word. Jurisdiksieprobleme, bewysvereistes en politieke sensitiwiteite speel almal ook ’n rol. Owerhede het erken dat hoewel die wet in beginsel duidelik is, die praktiese toepassing daarvan - veral retrospektief en oor landsgrense heen - baie meer ingewikkeld is.
Politiek, die reg en onopgeloste vrae
Die debat is onafskeidbaar van Suid-Afrika se sterk politieke steun vir Palestynse regte en sy regsaak teen Israel by die IGH. Regeringsretoriek bepaal dat deelname aan die IW toenemend nie net as ’n skending van binnelandse reg nie, maar ook moontlik kan impliseer dat ‘n individu skuldig is aan internasionale misdade. Geen Suid-Afrikaanse hof het egter nog hieroor ’n uitspraak gelewer as dit in verband met IW-diensplig gebring word nie.
Gerapporteerde of beweerde Suid-Afrikaners in die Israeliese Weermag (IW)
Belangrike konteks
FOTO: Die broers Keith and Brett Isaacson, gebore in Klerksdorp
Billy Joel’s “We Didn’t Start the Fire” lists 119 quick‑fire references to people, events, and trends from 1949 to 1989. The song is not a neat list of “top” events, but it name‑checks many major historical turning points alongside pop‑culture moments. Taken together, the song argues that each generation inherits a world of fires started by the one before. The little lyric “in war we should look at the people and not the causes” fits that theme: the events are vast, but the human cost is what stays the same.
For many people, war is something watched from a distance - filtered through headlines, statistics, and political analysis. But when friends live inside those war zones, the distance collapses. The conflict becomes personal, immediate, and impossible to ignore.
After more than four decades in journalism, I have met people across the world who became more than sources or contacts. They became friends. From Journalists Ilsa and Thomas Grandos in Cuba, to Jahanbin and Chitra in Iran, and Ayed in the Gaza Strip. These relationships were built across cultures, languages, and political systems. Yet, at their core, they were grounded in a shared human experience: the desire to live, to survive, and to build meaningful lives under circumstances not of our choosing.
Today, all three of these places are caught in the shadow of conflict - directly or indirectly shaped by the actions of the United States, Israel, or both.
War’s human reach
In Gaza, Ayed lives through what has become one of the deadliest modern conflicts. Since October 2023, more than 72,000 people have been killed, with tens of thousands more injured. Entire neighbourhoods have been flattened. Critical infrastructure - roads, hospitals, schools, and water systems - has been devastated, leaving much of the enclave uninhabitable.
For those on the ground, survival has become a daily struggle. Most of Gaza’s population has been displaced, living in tents or among the ruins of destroyed homes. Food shortages, collapsing sanitation systems, and the spread of disease have compounded the humanitarian crisis.
In Iran, the escalation of hostilities since late February 2026 has opened another front in an already volatile region. The war - marked by high-tech strikes and long-range missile exchanges - has resulted in thousands of deaths. Estimates vary, but figures suggest between 3,000 and over 5,000 people have been killed within three weeks, including civilians, soldiers, and emergency workers.
Jahanbin and Chitra now find themselves witnessing a different kind of war - one defined not only by explosions, but by uncertainty. Airstrikes, infrastructure damage, and the constant threat of escalation have disrupted daily life. The conflict has also highlighted the rigid political structure within Iran, where strict religious governance shapes both public and private life.
Cuba - A crisis beyond the battlefield
While Gaza and Iran are active war zones, Cuba represents a different, yet deeply connected, dimension of crisis. And Donald Trump might still decide to attack the island as well to enforce regime change.
Ilsa (Thomas died unexpectedly two years ago) is not facing airstrikes, but her daily live is shaped by severe economic collapse. Prolonged blackouts - sometimes lasting more than 15 hours a day - have crippled essential services, from healthcare to sanitation. Food shortages, inflation, and a collapsing currency have pushed many Cubans to the brink.
Since 2021, nearly two million people have left Cuba in search of better opportunities. The situation has worsened following a tightening of U.S. sanctions under Donald Trump, including an oil blockade that has drastically reduced fuel imports.
The result is a slow-moving humanitarian crisis, one that lacks the visibility of war but carries its own form of hardship and instability.
For South Africans, the situation in Cuba carries additional historical resonance. During the border wars in Angola between 1975 and 1988, Cuba and apartheid South Africa stood on opposing sides. On the other hand, in the same years, Cuba became a key ally of the anti-apartheid movement, forging a relationship rooted in solidarity and shared struggle.
This historical connection adds another layer of complexity to how many South Africans view Cuba’s current crisis - one shaped by both past alliances and present realities.
Iran - a region under strain
The current US–Israel confrontation with Iran has been described by analysts as one of the most technologically advanced wars to date, surpassing even the scale of daily strikes seen in Ukraine. Early in the conflict, more than 1,000 coordinated strikes targeted over 150 locations across Iran, including military installations and civilian areas.
The streets I walked with my friends, and the historic cities and towns we visited on sightseeing trips, have now mostly seen widespread destruction:
Despite differing contexts, a common thread links these crises: civilians bear the heaviest burden. Whether through bombs, sanctions, or economic collapse, ordinary people are left to navigate the consequences of geopolitical decisions made far beyond their control.
When war is no longer distant
What unites these stories is not just conflict, but connection. The wars in Gaza and Iran, and the crisis in Cuba, are often analysed through strategic and political frameworks. But behind the statistics are individuals - friends, families, communities - living through the consequences.
When those individuals are people you know, the nature of war changes. It is no longer abstract or distant. It becomes immediate, personal, and deeply human.
In a world increasingly defined by interconnected crises, the line between observer and participant is becoming harder to maintain. For journalists, and for anyone with ties across borders, the reality is clear: war is never as far away as it seems.
Die Verenigde State ondergaan die vinnigste godsdienstige transformasie in sy moderne geskiedenis, aangevuur deur ’n skerp toename in die aantal mense wat hulself as godsdienstig onverbonde identifiseer en ’n golf van kerk sluitings regoor die land.
Byna drie uit elke tien Amerikaanse volwassenes beskryf hulself nou as godsdienstig onverbonde - ’n styging van 33% sedert 2013 - volgens die nie-partydige Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI). Die verskuiwing vind oor rassegroepe heen plaas en is veral opvallend onder jonger Amerikaners: sowat 38% van mense tussen 18 en 29 jaar identifiseer as onverbonde, teenoor 32% ’n dekade gelede. Gallup-opnames toon dat 57% van Amerikaners selde of nooit kerkdienste bywoon nie, ’n beduidende toename vanaf 40% in 2000.
Godsdienstige demograwe en konsultante waarsku dat dié afname ’n spoor van sogenaamde “kerkbegraafplase” agterlaat - leë geboue wat moeilik verkoop kan word of heeltemal verlate raak. Na raming het sowat 15,000 kerke vanjaar hul deure gesluit - veel meer as die paar duisend wat na verwagting weer sal oopmaak. Baie van hierdie kerke het voorheen as burgerlike gemeenskapsentrums gedien, insluitend vergaderplekke vir Alkoholiste Anoniem, stemlokale en dorpsale. Die verdwyning van die kerkgeboue laat ’n leemte in die burgerlike en sosiale lewe, veral in kleiner dorpe en stedelike woonbuurte. Hoewel megakerke tekens van stabiliteit toon, sê ontleders dit is nie voldoende om die algehele nasionale afname om te keer nie.
Die afname in institusionele godsdiens val saam met die opkoms van nie-tradisionele en digitale vorme van spiritualiteit. Namate Amerikaners “ontkerk,” word identiteit en geloof toenemend gevorm deur YouTube-mistici, TikTok-lesers, aanlyn-skeptici, volkshelde en selfs KI-gegenereerde gebedshulpmiddels. YouTube-kanale wat fokus op spirituele manifestasie en innerlike wysheid lok honderde duisende intekenare, terwyl video’s van toesprake deur figure soos die oorlede sterrekundige Carl Sagan en Bitse evolutionêre bioloog Richard Dawkins - albei krities teenoor godsdiens - miljoene kykers gelok het.
Terselfdertyd het toewyding aan nie-amptelike Katolieke Latyns-Amerikaansse volksheiliges soos Santa Muerte en Jesús Malverde buite formele godsdienstige instellings toegeneem. Kenners meen die tendens weerspieël ’n breër herkonfigurasie van geloof eerder as bloot ’n verlies aan geloof.
Ontleders beskryf hierdie veranderinge as tektonies, met verreikende implikasies vir rasseverhoudinge, burgerlike identiteit, politieke oorreding en bestuur in ’n toenemend gefragmenteerde morele landskap. Namate tradisionele godsdienstige instellings terugtrek, bly die vraag wat - indien enigiets - hul sosiale en burgerlike rol sal vervang.
Wie stuur wie? Die ware magspel agter Amerika en Israel se alliansie
In wese is die verhouding tussen die VSA en Israel nie een van beheer nie, maar ‘n strategiese verhouding. Ek wil die verhouding amper beskryf as een waar Amerika vir israel as sy “proxie” in die Midde Ooste gebruik. Vir dekades funksioneer Israel as ’n kritieke Amerikaanse vennoot in ’n onstabiele streek, en bied Israel militêre, intelligensie- en tegnologiese voordele wat min ander bondgenote kan ewenaar.
Vanuit Washington se perspektief is Israel nie bloot ’n ontvanger van steun nie, maar ’n “magsvermenigvuldiger” - ’n land wat in staat is om mag te projekteer, teenstanders te beveg en om sodoende Amerikaanse belange te stabiliseer, dit alles sonder dat Amerika wéér grootskaalse ontplooiing van troepe moet doen soos in Afganistan.
Hierdie strategiese logika word veral sigbaar in die konteks van Iran. Albei lande beskou Iran as ’n sentrale streeksbedreiging, alhoewel Amerika Iran ook sien as ‘n gevaar vir wêreldsekuriteit. Israeliese leiers, insluitend mense soos Benjamin Netanyahu, het konsekwent gepleit vir ’n meer aggressiewe benadering t.o.v. Iran, insluitend voorkomende aanvalle en druk op regeringsvlak. Tog wil dit voorkom of Amerika onder druk van binne groter sensitiwiteit begin opbou vir globale ekonomiese gevolge, risiko’s van eskalasie en die bestuur van alliansies. Hierdie verskille onderstreep ’n kernpunt: vennootskap beteken nie ondergeskiktheid nie.
Binnelandse politiek in die VSA het die prentjie vir Trump gekompliseer. Steun vir Israel is een van die min blywende sake waaroor die Republikeine en Demokrate nog saamstem en dit in ’n andersins gepolariseerde politieke stelsel. Belangegroepe soos AIPAC, saam met invloedryke groepe soos die evangeliese Christene en dele van die Joods-Amerikaanse gemeenskap, help om hierdie steun te handhaaf. Hul invloed funksioneer binne die breër ekosisteem van Amerikaanse lobby-werk en verkiesingspolitiek en vorm beleidsvoorkeure.
Terselfdertyd het Israel ’n vermoë getoon om hierdie omgewing doeltreffend te benut. Deur diplomatieke betrokkenheid, die deel van intelligensie met Amerika en konsekwente waarskuwings oor gedeelde bedreigings, slaag Israel daarin om Amerikaanse beleid nader aan hul eie veiligheidsprioriteite te bring. Die aanloop tot konfrontasies met Iran illustreer hierdie dinamiek: Israeliese druk, gekombineer met strategiese argumente, het Washington in ’n meer konfronterende rigting gestoot as wat dit andersins sou kies.
Daar is egter duidelike perke aan hierdie invloed. Amerika behou uiteindelike beheer oor hul militêre besluite, befondsing en diplomatieke beleid. Oomblikke van spanning - soos Amerikaanse huiwering om sekere ekonomiese infrastruktuur te teiken of kommer oor wêreldwye oliemarkte - wys dat Washington se prioriteite wel van dié van Israel kan verskil. Hierdie verskille word veral duidelik wanneer konflikte dreig om in ‘n breër streeks- of globale krisis te ontaard.
Persepsies van Israeliese “beheer” word tydens die oorlog teen Iran versterk, wanneer Amerikaanse baie duidelik sigbaar is en boonop skynbaar onvoorwaardelik is. Toenemende oorlogsmoegheid onder Amerikaanse kiesers, verskuiwende openbare mening oor Trump se Midde-Oosterse beleid en die enorme ekonomiese koste van ‘n langdurige konflik plaas nuwe druk op Amerikaanse besluitneming. Hierdie faktore kan mettertyd die balans binne die VSA-Israeli-alliansie herkalibreer, selfs al verander dit nie die fundamentele beginsels daarvan nie.
So, die antwoord op die vraag wat by die inleiding gevra is, lê in die diep interafhanklike verhouding tussen die VSA en Israel en waarin Israel wel ook invloed uitoefen - soms beduidend - maar altyd binne die breër perke wat Amerikaanse magsbelange en politieke wil daarop plaas.
In daardie sin sien ons waarom Amerika voortgaan om hul vennootskap met Israel as die moeite werd beskou - selfs wanneer die prys wat betaal word beteken dat Washington betrokke raak by een van die mees onvoorspelbare konflikte in die Midde-Ooste.
Kontak Jurie van der Walt direk. Jou boodskap sal per e-pos gestuur word.
